We consider environmental risks that are evaluated too heavy for a single insurance company, but that can be insured by n companies which a premium is assigned to. This is precisely the Italian scenario where a pool of companies co-insures these risks. Under a game theoretic approach we start by analyzing how they should split the risk and the premium in order to be better off. Under suitable hypotheses, there exists an optimal decomposition of the risk, that allows us to define a cooperative game whose properties and some particular solutions are analyzed.
Introduction
In this paper we consider environmental pollution risks depending on firms that in their production processes may have as a side effect the release of polluting wastes, that damage the environment.
Firms may interact with the environment in different ways; more precisely they can alter the standard environment, influence the possibilities of using it damaging public or private goods, compromise directly or indirectly the human health, contaminate biological resources and ecosystems.
The consequences may be described as damages to persons and/or materials or interruption of various activities (industrial, agricultural or recreational) .
We want to recall some environmental pollution risks according to a simple classification:
• air pollution, generated by emissions, harmful gases, exhaust fumes, stenches, waste disposals, chemical productions; • water pollution, when the factories discharge effluents in the rivers;
• soil pollution, deriving from rubbish, solid wastes, industrial wastes, for example from farms that use chemical manures or pesticides or from factories that dispose their wastes in the soil; • marine pollution, this happens in the case of coastal firms that get rid wastes and sewage in the sea or by oil tankers accidents; • acoustic pollution, due to high noise level and vibrations with a risk for workers and neighboring inhabitants. In order to limit the costs related to environmental risk a firm generally effects an insurance policy that cover both third party liability for any damage that may be caused to persons or materials and unpollution costs due to removal of pollutants (cfr. Bazzano, 1994) .
The losses for environmental pollution can be very heavy as it is shown in [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] Naval transportation accidents are not included
Moreover we want just to mention that the Lloyd's alone were charged with about 15 billions of euros (cfr. "Il sole 24 ore" 27 September 2001), only to refund damages related to absestos in about twenty years (but some trials are still lasting). So it is not possible that a single insurance company accepts to assume this risk on her own; as a consequence it is insured by a pool of companies.
For example in Italy there is a pool of 61 insurance companies that is the unique responsible for all such kind of risks, where each company assumes a percentage of risk as in Table 2 . Here we suppose that n companies all together have to insure a given risk. Two important intertwined practical questions that arise then read: Which premium should they charge? How should they split the risk and the premium in order to make the n companies as competitive as possible and obtain a fair division? This problem can be modelled as a cooperative game.
We want to remark that the first examples of applications of game theory to insurance were given by Borch (1962a Borch ( , 1962b and Lemaire (1977 Lemaire ( , 1991 and more recently by Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1999) ; we address to Suijs (2000) for a survey on these topics.
The organization of the paper is the following: In Section 2 we give the formal description of a co-insurance problem introducing suitable notations and hypotheses, and state some preliminary results; Section 3 deals with a class of co-insurance games, paying particular attention to the property of balancedness and analysing some classical game theoretical solutions; Section 4 is devoted to the case of optimal decomposition of the risk in constant quotas; finally in Section 5 we summarize our results applying them to a case study, using the data of the Italian situation.
Hypotheses and Notations
As already said in the Introduction we consider a problem in which a risk is evaluated too much heavy for a single insurance company, but it can be insured by n companies, where each company assumes a quota of the risk and receives a fraction of the premium.
We consider a fixed and suitable probability space; we denote the set of companies by N = {1, ..., n} and we suppose that every company i ∈ N , expresses her valuation of a random variable X as the value H i (X), where H i is a functional from a class L of random variables (the insurable risks) into the set of real numbers, IR; this means that, given a risk X, H i (X) provides a measure of X (expected claims and security considerations). In order to determine the commercial premium to be charged, each company have to take into account her evaluation of the risk and usual economic factors (commissions and expenses).
As in Deprez and Gerber (1985) (see also Gerber, 1980 and Goovaerts et al., 1984) , we add the hypotheses that a loading for a degenerate risk is not justified (a) and that if a risk is increased by an additive constant, this constant has to be added to the evaluation of the risk (translation invariance b), so for each i ∈ N we ask that:
Many classical principles satisfy this hypothesis, for example:
• the net premium principle H(X) = E(X), where E(X) is the expectation of X;
• the variance principle H(X) = E(X) + aV (X), where V (X) is the variance of X and a > 0;
and u is the utility function of the insurance company which has an initial surplus z; in particular for exponential utility u(x) = 1 a
(1 − e −ax ), with a > 0 we haveH = 1 a lnE(e aX ).
• the ε-percentile principle H(X) = min {x|F (x) ≥ 1 − ε}, where F is the distribution function of X.
Now we suppose that the n companies have to insure a given risk R and receive a premium π. Each company can decide to co-insure the risk or not, i.e. she has to be considered a decision maker; as a consequence in order to define "fair" allocations of the pair (π, R) we introduce the following notations, referring to all subsets (coalitions) S of companies involved. For any subset of companies S ⊆ N we denote by D(S) the set of feasible divisions of the premium π, i.e.:
and by A(S) the set of the feasible decompositions of the risk R, i.e.:
and we suppose that A(S) is non-empty. According to the allocation
, for each i ∈ S the company i receives the amount d i and pays the random variable X i . Now we suppose that for each subset S ⊆ N it is possible to compute an optimal decomposition of the risk, i.e. we introduce the hypothesis:
P (S) can be seen as the evaluation that the companies in S (as a whole) give of the risk R.
Example 1 ∀ i ∈ N the variance principle holds, i.e.:
It is possible to prove (Deprez -Gerber, 1985) that P (N ) = P i∈N H i (q i R); moreover as in Fragnelli-Marina (2001) we have:
and q(S) = P i∈S q i and we can also write:
Now we consider the allocations of (π, R) that assign to each company a risk and an amount high enough to cover this risk. Formally for any subset of companies S ⊆ N we define the set of individually rational allocations:
if the premium is larger than the evaluation (of the set of companies in S) of the optimal decomposition of the risk, there not exist individually rational allocations and vice versa.
Remark 3 In order to avoid trivial situations we suppose that π > P(N ), i.e. the n companies all together may obtain a positive gain.
For any subset of companies S ⊆ N such that B(S) 6 = ∅ we may define the set of allocations of (π, R) corresponding to optimal risk decompositions:
) and the set of Pareto optimal allocations of (π, R):
We can state the following theorem similar to Proposition 3.5 of :
The proof is close to that of Proposition 1 in Fragnelli-Marina (2001) , with S in the role of N .
Remark 4 If
Finally we define two subsets of the set of Pareto optimal allocations for the grand coalition N :
The allocations in the set Q(N ), restricted to the subsets S ⊂ N , are such that there do not exist Pareto optimal allocations for the set S preferable to them (for those subsets S for which individually rational allocations exist), while the set CO(N ) contains those allocations for which the restriction to any subset S ⊆ N is rational for that subset, i.e. guarantees that S cannot do better acting separately by itself. We have:
suppose that there exists a coalition S with π−P(S) > 0 (so B(S) 6 = ∅) s.t.
The argumentations of the previous proof are similar to those of Theorem 2 in Lari -Marina (2000) .
Co-Insurance Games
All what we said in the previous sections can be reviewed under the light of game theory. We recall that a cooperative game in characteristic function form with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) where N is the set of players and v is a real valued function on 2 N , with v(∅) = 0, where v(S), S ⊆ N is the worth of coalition S. Given a game (N, v) the core is the set
The first condition is called coalition rationality and expresses that given an allocation x ∈ Core(v) each coalition S get at least its worth; the second condition is called ef f iciency and says that the core allocations divide exactly the worth of the grand coalition N . When a game has non-empty core it is said to be balanced.
For our co-insurance problem we define a game whose characteristic function v is:
The following theorem states a connection between the allocations of the co-insurance problem and the allocations of the co-insurance game.
Before studying the properties of the game we can reorder the players in such a way that:
As a consequence we have
In these general hypotheses we can state the following results:
Lemma 1 π ≤ P (N \ {1}) ⇒ the game is balanced. Proof. If P (N ) < π ≤ P (N \ {1}) a core-allocation is given by x = (π − P (N ), 0, ..., 0).
In fact x is efficient as P
Lemma 2 π > P i∈N P (N \ {i}) − (n − 1)P (N ) ⇒ the game is not balanced.
Proof. Note that by hypothesis it follows that π > P (N \ {i}) and then v(N \ {i}) = π − P (N \ {i}), ∀ i ∈ N . For a balanced game we have that for each core allocation (x i ) i∈N :
and consequently:
But we have:
that is equivalent to the hypothesis of the lemma, so the core is empty.
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Finally we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 4 There exists b π such that the game is balanced if and only if π ≤ b π
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 in Fragnelli et al. (2000) . Now we introduce a hypothesis that allows us to determine the value of b π defined in Theorem 4.
Hypothesis 3
We ask that the cost function P satisfies the (reduced convexity) hypothesis:
Theorem 5 Suppose that P satisfies Hypothesis 3, then b
Proof. In view of Lemma 2 and of Theorem 4 it is sufficient to prove that the game is balanced for π= P j∈N P (N \ {j}) − (n − 1)P (N ). We will prove that the marginal solution x = (P (N \ {1}) − P (N ), ..., P (N \ {n}) − P (N )) is a core allocation. Note that x i ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N . x is efficient in fact:
X i∈N
To prove that x is coalitionally rational we consider first the case of v(S) = 0 that is trivial as x ≥ 0; in the case of v(S) > 0 we have:
Let N \ S = {t 1 , ..., t m }; the previous inequalities holds as a surrogate of the following relations:
Now we want to analyse the particular case in which P satisfies Hypothesis 3 and the premium is precisely b π = P j∈N P (N \ {j}) − (n − 1)P (N ), referring to classical game theoretical solution concepts.
We claim that the core is the singleton whose only element is the marginal solution x = (P (N \ {1}) − P (N ), ..., P (N \ {n}) − P (N )). Suppose that there exists a different core allocation y; by efficiency there exists a player j such that y j > x j ; in this case X i∈N \{j}
so y is not coalitionally rational and does not belong to the core.
As a consequence x is also the nucleolus of the game. This solution concept corresponds to the unique allocation that minimize the maximum excess of the coalitions, according to a lexicographic order and it lies in the core if it is non-empty (for more details see Schmeidler 1969) .
In 1981 Tijs introduced as a solution for a TU-Game the τ -value, the first of a series of compromise values; it is defined as follows:
the marginal contribution of player i and let
¢ the τ -value is the unique convex combination of M and m s.t. P i∈N τ i = v(N ). In our situation, for each player i we have:
As the game is balanced then it is also quasi-balanced and so M i ≥ m i ; on the other hand by definition of m i we have:
and finally m i = M i = τ i .
Remark 5 If π>
then not only the game is not balanced but it is neither quasi-balanced in fact:
Moreover we have also:
Referring to Example 1 we have that the cost function P satisfies the reduced convexity hypothesis 3 and the optimal decomposition consists of constant quotas. In the next section we study this more general situation.
Constant Quotas
In this section we suppose that there exist a convex function H and n real numbers q 1 ≥ ... ≥ q n > 0, P i∈N q i = 1 s.t.:
If the function H verifies Hypothesis 1 and is strictly convex (i.e.
and is Gâteaux differentiable, we have (cfr. Deprez -Gerber (1985) and Lari -Marina (2000) ) that, for each S ⊆ N :
(where q(S) = P i∈S q i )
Remark 6 The equality holds only if there exist (γ i ) i∈S ∈ IR |S| s.t. P i∈S γ i = 0 and
Now we have:
Proposition 1 The function P verifies Hypothesis 3.
Proof. We define the functions g(z) = H(zR) and h(z) = zg ¡ 1 z ¢ for each z > 0. By the convexity of H we have that g is a convex function. Moreover let 0 < z 1 < z 2 and let λ ∈]0, 1[; we have
and so
So we have that h is a convex function and then P verifies Hypothesis 3. 2
As a consequence of Theorem 5 also in this more general case if the value of the premium is exactly P j∈N P (N \ {j}) − (n − 1)P (N ), the core is non empty and the only core allocation is the marginal solution, that assigns to each player exactly his marginal contribution; it corresponds to the co-insurance problem allocation (q i P (N ) + P (N \ {i}) − P (N ), q i R) i∈N that belongs to CO(N ).
Before concluding the paper we want to analyze the widely used proportional (problem) allocation (q i π, q i R) i∈N ; more precisely we are interested if this allocation belongs to CO(N ).
First we check that this solution belongs to B(N ); we have:
where the last inequality is true according to our hypothesis of non-trivial situation. The previous result guarantees that P i∈S (q i π−H i (q i R)) ≥ 0, so if π−P(S) ≤ 0 ∀S 6 = N then trivially the proportional allocation belongs to CO(N ).
Otherwise at least π−P(N \ {n}) > 0 and for those S 6 = N such that π−P(S) > 0 the condition is:
By the convexity of H the last condition holds for all S 6 = N s.t. π−P(S) > 0 if and only if it holds for S = N \ {n}, so for the proportional allocation we have:
If the premium is exactly e π as above, reverting to the game we have:
In this case the game solution related to the previous proportional allocation is ³
; this means that player n gets exactly its marginal contribution, while each player i ∈ N \ {n} gets the marginal contribution of player n times the ratio among q i and q n . Note that these amounts are non increasing. We can also investigate the relationship of the proportional solution with the marginal solution of the previous section, when the function P satisfies the hypothesis of convexity and the premium is π=
In this case the proportional solution assigns to player i the amount q i ³ P j∈N P (N \ {j}) − P (N )´, while the marginal solution assigns the amount P (N \ {i}) − P (N ). This means that the proportional solution divides each marginal contribution proportionally among all the players (that get also the "refund" of the risk assumed) while, as we said above, the marginal solution assigns to each player exactly his marginal contribution (besides the "refund" of the risk assumed).
Case Study
In this concluding section we want to apply our results to the data of the Italian case (see Section 1). We lack of suitable real data so we make some assumptions. We suppose that the 61 companies, as in Example 1, express their evaluation of a random variable X according to the variance principle. Next we suppose that q i , i ∈ N are the quotas of the risk as in Table 2 and a(N ) = 0.1; finally we suppose that the distribution function of the risk R is F (x) = 1 − e −µx , so we have E(R) = 1 µ and V ar(R) = 1 µ 2 . We make the assumption that E(R) is 1.05 (µ = and some allocations for the problem and for the game, as in Table 3 .
These allocations clearify why if π = P j∈N P (N \ {j}) − (n − 1)P (N ) the proportional allocation is not in the core of the game: It assigns too much to last players, w.r.t. what is assigned to the first players. This means that the unique core allocation, i.e. the marginal solution, is favourable to the first players, i.e. those who assume larger quotas of risk; on the other hand the proportional solution is more "levelled" so that in order to have a core allocation it is necessary to have a lower premium that produces an amount assigned to the last player by the proportional allocation at most equal to the amount of the marginal one. Table 3 Some allocations for the problem and for the game (in euros) For the problem marg = q i P (N ) + P (N \ {i}) − P (N ); for the game marg = P (N \ {i}) − P (N )
